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NEVADA SUPREME COURT REVISES SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Nevada Supreme Court, in a recent affirmation of a Nevada District Court decision, clarified Nevada’s summary judgment standard.

The case of Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. Adv. Rep. 73 (2005); 121 P.3d 1026 (Nev. 2005), involved a mentally handicapped Safeway employee who was sexually assaulted at work. The perpetrator was a nighttime employee of a janitorial company that provided services to the store. A lawsuit was filed against Safeway and the janitorial company. The District Court granted summary judgment to Safeway, as it was immune from suit based on The Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. The janitorial company was also granted summary judgment as Nevada statutory law precluded liability of an employer for an intentional tort committed by its employee when such an act is determined to be a superseding cause.

In affirming the granting of summary judgment, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the “slightest doubt” standard, found in prior Nevada summary judgment jurisprudence. The “slightest doubt” standard became a part of Nevada’s summary judgment analysis in 1954, when it quoted from a 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals case. Nevada common law then embraced two lines of summary judgment jurisprudence, one of which was the “slightest doubt” standard, while the other was the more modern federal standard summarized as follows:

“[A] genuine issue of material fact exists [precluding summary judgment] where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 1038. (citation omitted).

The existence of both standards caused confusion, for which the Supreme Court was criticized. Since 1954, various other jurisdictions throughout the country have been critical of the slightest doubt standard for unduly limiting the use of summary judgment. The Wood Court looked to two United States Supreme Court cases from 1986 that undermined the slightest doubt standard. The Court also looked at other Nevada Supreme Court cases that seemingly rejected the standard.

The Wood Court stated:

"We take this opportunity to put to rest any questions regarding the continued viability of the "slightest doubt" standard. We now adopt the standard employed in [two US Supreme Court cases]. Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The substantive law controls which factual disputes are material and will preclude summary judgment; other factual disputes are irrelevant. A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

While the pleadings and other proof must be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party bears the burden to ‘do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt’ as to the operative facts in order to avoid summary judgment being entered in the moving party's favor. The nonmoving party ‘must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him.’ The nonmoving party ‘is not entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation, and conjecture.’ To the extent that [plaintiff] relies on the ‘slightest doubt’ standard, our discussion above abrogates that standard from Nevada’s summary judgment law and renders her arguments irrelevant." Id. at 1031. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added)

The Court reviewed the facts and applicable law vis a vis each defendant, and determined that summary judgment was warranted as no genuine issues of fact remained that could affect plaintiff’s recovery. Thus, the District Court’s decision was upheld.

The strong language laid out in the Wood case should be a cue to the Nevada District Courts that summary judgment should be granted not only in the most extreme cases, but should be considered, “an integral part of the [Rules of Civil Procedure] as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Id. at 1030. The general reluctance of the courts to grant summary judgment in lieu of allowing a trial on the merits should be balanced with the intent of the Supreme Court in clarifying the appropriate standard.

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